UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE

NATHAN HARVEY #358931,

Plaintiff,

v. No.: 3:05-cv-071

(VARLAN/GUYTON)

DR. TIMOTHY P. McCONNELL and SHERIFF JAMES L. BERRONG,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

The court is in receipt of a *pro se* prisoner's civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an application to proceed *in forma pauperis*. It appears from the application that the plaintiff lacks sufficient financial resources to pay the \$150.00 filing fee. Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4), the Clerk is **DIRECTED** to file this action without the prepayment of costs or fees or security therefor as of the date the complaint was received. However, for the reasons stated below, process shall not issue and this action is

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DISMISSED.

Plaintiff is an inmate in federal custody. He brought this action for an alleged violation of his civil rights during his confinement in the Blount County Justice Center. The

<sup>1</sup>Plaintiff submitted his complaint before the filing fee increased from \$150.00 to \$250.00.

defendants are Dr. Timothy P. McConnell, a dentist in Blount County, Tennessee, and Blount County Sheriff James L. Berrong.

In his original complaint, plaintiff alleged medical malpractice on the part of Dr. McConnell. According to plaintiff, he was taken from the Blount County Justice Center to Dr. McConnell's office to have his lower wisdom teeth extracted. After the extraction, Dr. McConnell allegedly told plaintiff the left socket had a minor infection, but failed to prescribe an antibiotic. Plaintiff alleges that the minor infection grew into a facial abscess that eventually required surgery. Plaintiff further alleges that he suffered severe pain and his life was in danger from the infection. In an amendment to the complaint, plaintiff has added Sheriff Berrong as a defendant.

Plaintiff's claim against Dr. McConnell is his alleged negligence in failing to prescribe an antibiotic after extracting plaintiff's wisdom teeth. In order to state a claim under § 1983 in the medical context, "a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The test for whether a defendant official has demonstrated "deliberate indifference" to medical needs is a subjective inquiry into the official's state of mind rather than an objective test. Negligence, even gross negligence, will not support a § 1983 claim for denial of medical care. *See Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); *Gibson v. Foltz*, 963 F.2d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 1992). "Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs" is distinguishable from an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care.

Thus, a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. See also Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532, 536-37 (6th Cir. 1991) (negligence of medical personnel does not state a claim under § 1983 for deliberate indifference to medical needs); Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976) ("Where a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.").

Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts which would indicate a deliberate indifference on the part of Dr. McConnell toward plaintiff's medical needs; the fact that plaintiff disagrees with the treatment he received from Dr. McConnell does not state a cognizable claim under § 1983. Plaintiff has stated at best a claim of medical malpractice and the proper forum for that would be the Tennessee state courts.

With respect to Sheriff Berrong, plaintiff's claim is based upon the sheriff's responsibility for prisoners in his custody. In a suit brought under § 1983, however, liability cannot be imposed solely on the basis of respondent superior. *Polk County v. Dodson*, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); *Bellamy v. Bradley*, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984). The law is well-settled that a plaintiff must allege that a defendant official was personally involved in the unconstitutional activity of a subordinate in order to state a claim against such a defendant. *Dunn v. State of Tennessee*, 697 F.2d 121, 128 (6th Cir. 1982). "[L]iability

cannot be based solely on the right to control employees." *Leach v. Shelby County Sheriff*, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989). Accordingly, plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim against Sheriff Berrong upon which relief may be granted.

Although this court is mindful that a *pro se* complaint is to be liberally construed, *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), it is quite clear that the plaintiff has not alleged the deprivation of any constitutionally protected right, privilege or immunity, and, therefore, the court finds his claims to be frivolous under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A. It appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief, *Malone v. Colyer*, 710 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1983), and that plaintiff's claim lacks an arguable basis in law and fact, *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Therefore, this action is **DISMISSED** *sua sponte*, as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1983. The court **CERTIFIES** that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good faith and would be totally frivolous. *See* Rule 24 of the FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.

Because the plaintiff is in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction, he is herewith **ASSESSED** the civil filing fee of \$150.00. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A) and (B), the custodian of the plaintiff's inmate trust account at the institution where he now resides is directed to submit to the Clerk, U.S. District Court, 800 Market Street, Suite 130, Knoxville, Tennessee 37902, as an initial partial payment, whichever is greater of:

(a) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly deposits to the plaintiff's inmate

trust account; or

(b) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly balance in the plaintiff's inmate

trust account for the six-month period preceding the filing of the complaint.

Thereafter, the custodian shall submit twenty percent (20%) of the plaintiff's

preceding monthly income (or income credited to the plaintiff's trust account for the

preceding month), but only when such monthly income exceeds ten dollars (\$10.00), until

the full filing fee of one hundred fifty dollars (\$150.00) as authorized under 28 U.S.C. §

1914(a) has been paid to the Clerk. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The Clerk is **DIRECTED** to send a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the

Warden of the West Tennessee Detention Facility, the Commissioner of the Tennessee

Department of Correction, and the Attorney General for the State of Tennessee to ensure that

the custodian of the plaintiff's inmate trust account complies with that portion of the Prison

Litigation Reform Act relating to payment of the filing fee. The Clerk is further

**DIRECTED** to forward a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the court's financial

deputy.

ENTER:

s/ Thomas A. Varlan

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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